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Abstract
This chapter addresses cultural production and global divides from a media geographer’s 
point of view by introducing ‘dead ground’ as its central concept. This concept is bor-
rowed from strategic thinking, originally a military term, and refers to ground that cannot 
be observed or experienced empirically – but (in this case) is often subjected to inference 
based on conventional thinking, ‘common knowledge’ based on experiences from other 
systems, or other epistemological environments that do not necessarily bear the required 
truth value. ‘Dead ground’ is explored as an ontological and epistemological concept, re-
lated to fallacies that are present in the globalisation discussion. It will particularly analyse 
three different fallacies: the single trajectory fallacy, the single rationality fallacy, and the 
single moral fallacy. 
The chapter raises the question as to whether these fallacies have been inherent in West-
ern media studies, and if they have, if they might have facilitated cognitive colonisation of 
the analysis of changing cultures. 
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Unknown Unknowns 
There are known knowns. There are things we know that we know. There are 
known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now know we don’t 
know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we do not know 
we don’t know. (Donald Rumsfeldt, US Secretary of Defence, 2002)
The starting statement is taken from Donald Rumsfeldt’s12th February 2002 press brief-
ing,1 held at the Pentagon, and relates to US operations against al Qaeda. In hindsight 
the sadly ironic twist of this statement is striking. At the time, however, it earned the 
Secretary of Defence the ‘Foot in the Mouth’ award for his usage of English language. 
Although intended in part to be tongue in cheek, Donald Rumsfeld gave quite an accurate 
definition for what is ‘dead ground’ and its significance in global, military thinking. 
Rumsfeldt’s ‘unknown unknown’ is the highest form of ignorance, something you cannot 
seek because you don’t know that it exists. It is a ‘dead ground’.
The concept of ‘dead ground’ is borrowed from strategic thinking and is originally a 
military term. It refers to ground that cannot be observed or experienced empirically – 
but is often subjected to inference based on ‘common knowledge’, that is conventional 
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thinking based on experiences from other systems or cultures. Dead ground is hidden 
from an observer because of man-made obstacles, natural hindrance or because of the 
differing epistemological and ontological frame. (Salovaara-Moring 2009a)
My point of departure is how our sense-making of global divides is always shadowed 
by dead ground because sense-making is implicitly territorial and temporal. As such 
it is always prone to several fallacies. Thus this chapter introduces the concept of dead 
ground as an aid to understanding fallacies that concern global divides, policy-making, 
and communication in certain historical and geopolitical contexts. Moreover, it takes a 
critical look at cultural production and communication at a macro-level, in an empirical 
context, building on examples from my own research into transitional Eastern European 
countries as well as conflict-ridden areas of Caucasus. 
Dead Ground, Change, and Complexities of Cultural Space 
Martin Heidegger described the event which we now call globalization as “planetary 
imperialism of technologically organized man”, which as an “organized uniformity” 
becomes the surest instrument of total rule over the Earth (Heidegger 1977: 152). In 
many cases this ‘technologically organized man’ can be located in Western hemisphere 
industrialized societies with an extensive history of colonialism.
Hence, it is not only Western epistemology that is based on knowledge-production 
that strives for control, prediction, and minimising uncertainty. Technology has also 
been engaged in the same mission: control, access, governance, and rule of territories. 
Moreover, Western politics and policy-thinking is often based on belief in linear systems: 
that is a belief that the arrangement of nature, social life, cultural productions, and its 
complications is one where outputs are proportional to inputs. Furthermore, one where 
the whole is equal to the sum of its parts, and where cause and effect are observable and 
quantifiable. It is an environment where careful planning facilitates prediction; where 
success is pursued by detailed monitoring and control; and where a premium is placed 
upon reductionism: rewarding those who excel in reductionist processes. Reductionist 
analysis and policy-making consists of taking large, complex problems and reducing 
them to manageable chunks.
However, many changing societies are nonlinear systems, which means the arrange-
ment of nature, life and its complications – such as new technologies, or media systems 
in developing democratic order – are systems where inputs and outputs are not propor-
tional, where the whole is not quantitatively equal to its parts, or even, qualitatively 
recognizable in its constituent components, and here cause and effect are not evident. 
This is an environment where phenomena are unpredictable but, within bounds, self-
organizing. One, where unpredictability frustrates conventional planning, where solution 
as self-organization defeats control, and where the ‘bounds’ are the actionable variable; 
requiring new ways of thinking and acting.
The collapse of communism and its consequential chains of events in the Soviet 
borderlands offer a good example of nonlinear systems and unforeseeable trajectories. 
When in the early 1990s communism collapsed, it brought a sudden end to the Cold 
War and lead to the independence of fourteen Central and Eastern European countries, 
in addition to eight more in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The collapse of state-run 
socialism also brought about a fundamental reorientation in scientific thought. Due to its 
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close proximity to ‘Europe proper’, Central Eastern Europe formed a social and political 
laboratory, a ‘terra incognita’ of post-utopian time.
The region itself became dead ground in social sciences: old concepts and theories 
did not apply in this new context because social structures were in flux. Most impor-
tantly, it was tabula rasa for capitalism: something to be used and exploited. Given the 
situation, it is ironic that it was Marx (1867/1968) who once said: “people don’t make 
their own history as they please but under circumstances directly encountered, given 
and transmitted from the past.” In many cases frozen territorial conflicts (Kosovo), old 
ethnic boundaries mixed with religious conflicts (the Balkans), and even tribal cleavages 
(Caucasus region) resurfaced on the political landscape. 
Eastern European countries can be considered as laboratories of democracy con-
taining ‘media laboratories’ that were forced to adjust to the development of changing 
societies as well economic globalisation. Those systems that seem to have worked in 
the West were initially accepted because there was no time for extensive experimenta-
tion. Media system crafting was based on imitation rather than invention. The route 
leading towards the more stable and mature European democracies and a free, account-
able media did not prove to be the predictable one-way path towards higher democratic 
standards that observers tended to believe. In many cases democracy, media systems, 
and economy were crafted simultaneously (see for example Jakubowicz 2007; Splichal 
2001, 1994; Sparks with Reading 1998; O’Neill et al.1998; O’Neill 1997). However, 
following its introduction, it was capitalism that became the force that modified the 
other two systems.
In my studies on post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, I encountered several 
fallacies that come out of cultural misunderstandings of dead ground. Often they are 
based on a Eurocentric or Anglo-Saxon normative understanding of how things should 
go, not how they actually evolve. Moreover, they are related to imported Western policy-
making practices that are implemented in a hybrid surrounding consisting of inherited 
Communist practices and newly adopted rules of liberal capitalism. In the following 
pages, I will focus on three fallacies caused by these misunderstandings. These are the 
single trajectory fallacy, the single rationality fallacy, and the single moral fallacy. 
Single Trajectory Fallacy: 
Spatial and Temporal Dead Ground
The first fallacy, the single trajectory fallacy, arrives from the presumption that all coun-
tries in transition are standing in queue, waiting to catch up with the West and arrive at 
some teleological end-state of an idealized model of capitalism, democracy, and com-
munication. Developing countries are ‘panoptized’ by the Western gaze by measuring 
their performance against benchmarks that are other than their own. These countries 
often face the obligation of following that path, whether through the development of 
administrative, media, or other policies, in order to be considered a good student of 
the West. It is obvious that the aforementioned teleological end-state does not exist. 
Moreover, there is no transit from one politico-economic stage to another. This fallacy 
is often a result of encountering spatial and temporal dead ground.
The spatial aspect refers to misunderstanding the borders, territories, and dynamics 
of the space of a given society. Western understanding of space is explicitly attached to 
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the concept of political borders and, through that, to the territory’s governance and their 
people. Through this perspective, states are the only legal actors on the international 
political stage. However, in many countries, borders set by post war treaties and interna-
tional agreements are seen as contrary to the real borders (such as Hungary in 1918, and 
the problematic delineation of Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia). This means that 
habitat, for example, instead of a political border can be regarded as the true boundary. 
Every cultural and regional entity has its internal borders and frontiers, the most 
important being between ethnic majority/minorities, historical/or religious and urban 
and rural. They are not official but can function as hard borders that have their own set 
of norms and values. The more prevalent or potent the internal border and frontier, the 
greater the level of instability can be expected. A typical example could be the hostile 
attitude towards ethnic groups that moved to a region during a time of oppression or as 
a part of the colonising political power. These ethnic groups include for example Rus-
sians in Latvia and Estonia but one could also mention many others around the world 
such as the French pied-noir in their former colonies in Africa, the British white settlers 
in Zimbabwe, or Asians in Fiji.
In many parts of the world, the identity of peoples and their collective rights tend 
to be bound to a notion of territoriality associated with responsibilities in relation to a 
given area, which are defined as collective spaces. These collective spaces may include 
human groups (both living and ancestral), forests, animals, watercourses, and so on. This 
difference in worldviews becomes apparent when exploitation of natural resources is 
driven by multinationals that base their exploitation on the right to property whilst the 
alternative voices of collective space are seldom heard. (de Sousa Santos, Nunes and 
Meneses 2007: 9). In addition, historical colonialisation of natural resources of now 
independent states, continue to create conflicts and re-modify the power geography of 
access and governance of oil, gas, and the spaces through which they can be transported 
(for example, the Baltic Sea and Caucasus region). 
The temporal aspect of dead ground refers to the fact that all cultural phenomena 
are located in spaces that are defined by their own temporality: framed by a specific 
scopic regime of time-space. Understanding temporal dead ground means that one has to 
become aware of a historicity that defines not only the conditions of the present but also 
possible futures. Histories of competing ideologies, oppressed nationhood, instability or 
conflict create not one but multiple complex and controversial histories. As the young 
Kosovan journalist, Ilirjana Bajo Law (2008) put it: “Nations are like human beings. If 
they live in a constant state of denial, never making peace with the past, they can make 
no progress and will have no future.” Controversial histories require an understanding 
of the polyvocality of lived temporalities – but also ruptures in temporalities. 
As many of those journalists I have interviewed2 have pointed out, both the people and 
the whole region are very rooted in the past. Faced with developments that are consid-
ered to be forced upon them and not embedded, people feel betrayed and this experience 
has not been properly acknowledged. At the same time, journalists were emphasising 
‘adaptability’ – people who can adapt to situations easily, make adjustments easily to 
situations, and be flexible. That notion was reflexive of a new mentality brought by the 
new capitalization of cultural economy. (Salovaara-Moring 2009b; 2009c)
This mode of capitalization is inherited from the early 90s, when Eastern European 
media systems financially started from scratch. Media systems were crafted against 
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the historical experience of oppression and had little sympathy for regulation. In many 
places this created the most deregulated media system there is, both in terms of legisla-
tion and cultural production. In some cases policy-making was based on an imitation 
of European and Western best practice. 
This development included some paradoxical features. The deregulation of media 
may well stand for freedom of expression, but it has also lead to surreptitious journal-
ism: journalism that can be bought off by money or vested political and/or business 
interests. In many countries that developed new policies, there were great worries about 
what foreign investments in the media sector would lead to. Often these worries were 
well founded – the investors operated in ‘dead ground’. However, this was not the case 
always. Sometimes, foreign ownership may have given greater freedom in a politically 
instable domestic situation by providing a stable financial basis (for example West-
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung Group in Bulgaria and Diena-Bonnier in Latvia).
At the same time, ideas of ‘watchdog’ news journalism were merely idealised self-
images held by Western observers. In the new trans-national constellation it was evident 
that such a final destination did not exist to any broader extent, neither in the East nor 
the West. In this context it must also be said that the relationship between democracy 
and media is hampered by market logics even in more mature democracies. In these 
societies of change, however, the media economy experienced severe difficulties due 
to undeveloped advertisement sector and withdrawal of state subsidies. This, in many 
cases, created intimate connections between business and media sector.
Capitalism, like any human system of exchange, is always a historical and tempo-
ral construct. As sociologists, such as Gil Eyal, Iván Szelenyi and Eleanor Townsley 
(1998), have pointed out: in Eastern Europe, capitalism was built without capitalists 
because the bourgeois class had been removed by state-socialism in the nationalisa-
tion of private property in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution. Thus the concept of 
class or traditionally stratified democracy was more or less inapplicable in analysing 
alternative capitalisms. This does not mean that there would not be social stratification 
in these societies but it certainly did not follow the Western type of class society. This 
also meant that within cultural economies there were agents from different spheres. In 
many cases Eastern Europe leapfrogged intermediate stages and landed in neo-liberal 
corporate capitalism of a kind that media industries were just developing in the West. 
Paradoxically, for example, the Financial Times often applauded this development by 
taking ‘New Europe’ as a model with its flat taxes and deregulation by scolding ‘Old 
Europe’ with its stubborn inflexibility. (Salovaara-Moring 2009d).The East was progres-
sive compared to the West, at least in global capitalism. The single trajectory fallacy was 
thus revealed to be a myth, and was actually turned back upon its proponents.
Single Rationality Fallacy: 
Epistemological Dead Ground 
The second fallacy is called the single rationality fallacy. It is based on misunderstand-
ings of epistemological dead ground. Single rationality fallacy refers to a misunder-
standing according to which human societies live by ‘Reason’ that is a way of thinking 
characterized by logic, analysis, and synthesis. Reason attempts to discover what is 
true and what is best for everyone and thus, for every place. In this type of thinking, 
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logics, analysis, and synthesis are not culturally embedded. Moreover, this rationalistic 
view often contrasts itself with a pejorative conceptualisation of emotionalism, which 
is presented as thinking driven by desire, passion, or prejudice. That is a thinking mode 
reserved for ‘traditional societies’. 
However, reason is not only historically constructed but also territorially bounded. 
In Western thinking, the concept of ‘reason’ is attached to the notion of a ‘functioning 
public sphere’ where ‘public sphere’ is universally floating and culturally detached 
normative category of political critique. In recent media studies trust in reason has fa-
cilitated sociological analysis with simplified forms of the Habermasian theoretisation 
of a ‘public sphere’ especially when adapted to changing societies. The fallacy appears 
in universally accepted premises of deliberation that ignore and reject alternative logics 
of the everyday that were hampered by capitalist logics and thus seldom actualised in 
any societies. 
In the early 1990s, the most significant requirements of evolving civil societies in 
Eastern Europe had to do with the social sphere including a functioning ‘public sphere’, 
with new practices of journalism that would support the consolidation of nationhood and 
democracy. That was a difficult task, given the mistrust that people felt towards politi-
cians and also, partly, towards media. Newly appointed governments – while hailing 
freedom of regulation and even anti-regulative sentiments – in unofficial ways often 
exerted direct political pressure on public or state media, and interfered with commercial 
media and the press. However, at the time of transition, a new generation of journalists 
also appeared on the scene. 
Journalism as a profession had deteriorated in status. Both in the West and the East, 
young journalists to a lesser extent see it as a ‘holy vocation’. They either see it as an 
(often poorly) paid job when compared with many other professions, or then the motiva-
tion of young journalists is more on the side of self-expression than that of serving the 
public or acting as the ‘watchdogs’ of the political system. One version of the ‘single 
reason fallacy’ is actually not to focus on agents, and how their behaviour rationality 
may change over time and in space – the fallacy appears in the supposition that ‘Western 
Reason’ is both a universal and an unchanging entity embracing all territories equally. 
Single Moral Fallacy: 
Ontological Dead Ground 
Ontological dead ground refers to imposing one’s own cultural categories upon studied 
phenomena and societies. Every culture has its own specific ontological structure, an 
epistemic regime through which things and relations are seen as normal and acceptable 
to its subscribers. Ontological order includes cultural principles, how categories of time 
and space are understood, moral orders, meta-concepts like good versus bad, divine 
versus evil, and so forth. This is the operating system of a culture, part of the hardware 
that triggers resistance when it is violated. 
Single moral fallacy refers to a fallacy that appears as a result of ontological dead 
ground. In its most typical form it appears as the Mother knows best syndrome. It is 
common to all dominant ideologies. The Single Moral Fallacy supposes that the ‘Other’ 
is incapable of governing himself according to alleged principles of “public good”. 
Therefore this ‘Other’ must be confined to certain, often Western, economic rules and 
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policy practices – although these practices are made by men who are incapable of acting 
upon them themselves. 
Typical confusion is created when forms of governance are exported from the outside 
to a region with different traditions. Liberal democracy, for example, is a loose group 
of Western cultural norms, traditions, and manners. Exporting political inventions (such 
as US-style institutions to Iraq or Eastern Europe) creates a Nietzchean dilemma where 
good intentions can create catastrophic consequences. The free market may represent 
freedom but if brought into a region  where other systems are in flux it may pose a new 
type of threat with its hard economic liberalism. Ontological realisation of good in the 
new context is often exceeded by less wanted side effects.
The Western credo i.e. discussions on ‘global citizenship or global media policy are 
often less than self-reflexive about their own ideological starting points. That is to say 
that the ‘global’ in these discussions is revealed to be more or less the same as ‘West-
ern’. Instead of being just broader ‘imagined communities’ they may often assume that 
Eurocentric or Anglocentric legal or political models (such as the neoliberal economic 
order, representative democracy, individualism, control over and often exploitation of 
natural resources) formed a single and accepted normative framework in all spatial and 
historical settings.
Public service broadcasting (PSB) gives us a clear example of where Western ide-
als/reason and economic and ideological realities of the region clashed during the first 
decade. The ‘media boom’ created markets that subordinated the public values of jour-
nalism, turning it into a commodity, and turning the ‘public’ into ‘consumers’. Thus, the 
idea of serving the ‘public’ found the soil of the region particularly barren. Normative 
ideals of PSB were mostly imported from wealthy European countries with BBC-type 
of journalism, whereas these financially weak states could not provide a strong enough 
fiscal base for their state-financed media. Although Western European countries suffered 
from the deteriorating financial base of their public service broadcasters, the ideology 
of serving the ‘public’ was, however, deeply engrained.
As expressed by a Latvian professor Inta Brikse: “Television is making paid pro-
grammes because of the lack of public money. What that really means is that the producer 
is collecting money from those who want to be in a programme and then the channel is 
making this programme. Of course these kinds of programmes are damaging the image 
of Latvian TV. We are paying for the channel and we don’t know when these attitudes 
are starting to affect the newscasts. The problem follows that the public opinion is that 
journalism is bought in Latvia.” (in personal interview)
The interests of nation-building and the free market were often contradictory. In 
many cases, PSB companies were forced to finance their activities by selling advertis-
ing space or collecting fees for those who wanted to express their opinion in the public 
channel because the level of subsidies granted by the states were insufficient. Commer-
cial broadcasters raised the same questions as in Western Europe: “What do we need 
state-financed media for when private companies can do it cheaper?” In theory PSB was 
good but in reality the enterprise was hard to actualise. The consequence of the single 
moral fallacy was that unrealistic models were maintained that may well have created 
more problems than they solved.
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Conclusions
So, to summarise, the main claim of this chapter is that the discussion on globalisation 
and global divides is often conducted at an abstract macro level. However, all human 
practices, whether cultural production, media policymaking or reception, are always 
located activities. As such they are located very concretely in time and space and carry 
their own culturally-embedded ontological and epistemological sense-making. Policy 
discourses, just like other normative discourses, however, often claim to have a univer-
sal and normative status. Moreover, surprisingly often they are outcomes of Western 
ways of thinking. When good ideas result in bad outcomes, this may be because of false 
universalism and not of allegedly disobedient people, cultures, and societies that do not 
conform to Western ideas.
Modern international politics and related policy practices can be easily captured as 
technologies of political subjects, their desires, territories, and resources (both human 
and natural). Distinctive institutional and symbolic media forms may emerge in response 
to a set of imperatives constructed in changing markets in order to govern the habits, 
fears, and passions of dispersed populations that differ from another territorial setting. 
In general, Western media policy practices can be seen as part of post-capitalist govern-
mentality that leans towards an image of flexible political reason that aims for adaptation. 
The new situation apparently calls for different thinking, theories, and openings in order 
to understand the ‘capitalization’ of cultural systems like journalism and how multiple 
spatio-temporal, country-specific constraints modifies systems in globalising contexts.
We have to understand that the dead ground formed by different cultural and eco-
nomic topographies rejects the Western political and epistemological dominance over 
the world. Devices of ‘normal’ science informing conscious media policy still cherish 
the idea of holding the high ground and the ability to base knowledge on inter-visibility 
between the observer and reality, narrative or ideology. This notion, however, requires 
revision. The best way to initiate this revision is to turn the gaze inwards, and open up 
the Western ‘capitalised’ morality based on hubris and vested interest in a one-sided 
trade-off. We should remember Anaïs Nin’s notion: ‘We don’t see things as they are, 
we see things as we are.’ Our reality of the world is not the final reality but just one 
competing cultural and economic form.
Notes
 1. U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) 
News Transcript http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 (accessed 5 
June 2008).
 2. This chapter is based on the research project ‘Beyond East and West: Media Geographies of New Europe’ 
(funded by the Academy of Finland 2007-2009).
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